Rethinking Arbitration Clauses in the Texas Business Court Era: Implications for Construction Contracts
Rethinking Arbitration Clauses in the Texas Business Court Era: Implications for Construction Contracts

The primary arbitration-versus-litigation checklist — faster, cheaper, private, lack of meaningful appeal — was built for a Texas that no longer exists. Two years of Business Court operation (since September 1, 2024) and the 2025 amendments in House Bill 40 changed the inputs on both sides of the ledger, and the change is not uniformly in one direction. Traditional arbitration advantages have eroded. One of its most valuable features has become substantially more attractive.

Here are some considerations that rarely appear in the standard clause-drafting memo.

Three Texas Arbitration Act Advantages That Get Overlooked

1. The Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) lets you buy appellate review. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not.

This is the single most underused provision in Texas arbitration practice.

In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), the Supreme Court held that the grounds for vacatur in § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act are exclusive, foreclosing agreements for expanded judicial review. Most practitioners stop there. But three years later, in Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011), the Texas Supreme Court held that the TAA permits parties to agree to judicial review of an award for reversible error, and that the FAA does not preempt enforcement of such an agreement under the TAA.

The drafting mechanic is the whole point, and it is counterintuitive. You do not expand the court’s authority; you limit the arbitrator’s. The clause in Nafta Traders provided that the arbitrator had no authority to render a decision containing reversible error of state or federal law, or to apply a cause of action or remedy not provided for under existing law. Exceeding that limited authority is itself a statutory vacatur ground.

For a client who wants arbitral expertise and privacy but cannot accept an unreviewable eight-figure award, this is a genuine third option. It is available only under the TAA — and most commercial clauses invoke the FAA reflexively, forfeiting it without anyone making a decision.

2. House Bill 40 turned the Business Court into arbitration’s support court.

This development has received almost no attention, and it should have received a great deal. H.B. 40, signed June 20, 2025, amended Chapter 171 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code to provide for venue in the Business Court for pre-arbitration applications, ancillary arbitration-related applications, and proceedings to confirm or vacate an award. It also amended Chapter 172, governing international commercial arbitration, to give the Business Court jurisdiction over applications for judicial assistance (such as challenges to arbitrator neutrality, interim protection measures, consolidation).

The practical consequence is significant. Your motion to compel, your § 171.088 vacatur fight, and your confirmation proceeding can now be heard by a judge selected for commercial expertise, who issues written opinions, with appeal to the Fifteenth Court of Appeals.

Combine this with the first point and a structure emerges that did not practically exist two years ago: TAA-governed arbitration, with contracted review for reversible error, reviewed by a commercial specialist, on appeal to a commercial appellate court. That is arbitration with a meaningful safety net.

One qualification travels with this, and it is addressed in detail below: the Business Court can serve as the support court only where the Business Court is available at all. That turns on the parties’ consent and on venue lying in a county within an operating division. A TAA clause drafted for expanded review, paired with a venue provision pointing to a county with no Business Court, gets none of this.

3. Cross-border enforceability is now the decisive edge, not one of several.

A Texas judgment can be worthless against assets held by a counterparty in certain countries located in the Gulf, West Africa, or Central Asia. An award under the New York Convention is enforceable in more than 170 jurisdictions.

This was always true. What has changed is its relative weight. Because the Business Court has narrowed arbitration’s domestic advantages in expertise, docket management, and decisional quality, foreign enforceability is increasingly the consideration that is genuinely and uniquely arbitral. For Texas companies with international counterparties — which, in the energy sector and increasingly the tech sector, is most of them — it is now a decisive factor in the analysis. Depending on the counterparty, this single consideration may resolve the arbitration-versus-litigation question entirely.

Three Risks of Arbitration That Are Overlooked

1. Under the FAA, a legally wrong award stands — and the Fifth Circuit means it.

In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009), the Fifth Circuit held that after Hall Street, manifest disregard of the law is no longer an independent ground for vacating an award under the FAA. The court has since reinforced that position, rejecting manifest disregard both as an independent ground and as a judicial gloss on the enumerated § 10 grounds.

Note: You can avoid this by selecting a seat of arbitration in a jurisdiction that still recognizes manifest disregard (1st, 9th Circuits).

Clients routinely underestimate the effect of this. It is not that appeals are difficult. It is that an arbitrator can misapply controlling Texas law, and the award will be confirmed. If the dispute turns on a contested question of contract construction or a limitations defense, an FAA arbitration clause is a gamble on selecting the right arbitrator, with no correction mechanism if you do not.

2. Electing the TAA to get that review means inheriting the TAA’s carve-outs.

Here is the trade-off that the Nafta Traders discussion almost always omits.

Section 171.002 excludes several categories from the TAA’s coverage, including collective bargaining agreements, workers’ compensation claims, agreements for an individual’s acquisition of property, services, money, or credit where the total consideration is not more than $50,000, and personal injury claims. The latter two are enforceable under the TAA only where the parties agree in writing and the agreement is signed by each party and each party’s attorney.

The FAA contains no such exceptions, and preempts them where it applies. So the election is a genuine trade: draft toward the TAA to unlock expanded review, and you give up the preemptive coverage that would have swept those carve-outs aside. In consumer-facing agreements, employment documents, and any form contract that might touch an individual counterparty, that exposure is real and is easy to create by accident.

3. The Business Court has closed much of the gap that justified the default arbitration clause.

H.B. 40 halved the amount-in-controversy threshold from $10 million to $5 million effective September 1, 2025, expanded the definition of a qualified transaction to include a series of related transactions, and clarified that the amount in controversy is the total of all joined parties’ claims. Mid-size commercial disputes — precisely the population where avoiding a general district docket was the most persuasive argument for arbitration — now qualify.

Meanwhile the court is doing what it was built to do. Rule 360 requires written opinions in specified circumstances and permits one with any order. The Business Court issued 42 written opinions in its first year, and the corpus reached roughly 117 opinions across the first 21 months, with a record 16 in May 2026 alone. Recent merits decisions have construed long-term ethylene supply and exchange rights, crude storage and transportation obligations, and the scope of drag-along provisions.

Arbitration produces none of this. Apart from the parties to the dispute, awards bind nobody and teach nobody. A company litigating the same form agreement repeatedly now forfeits access to a growing body of published Texas commercial precedent it could otherwise build and cite.

Two caveats belong in any honest assessment. Based on available data, roughly 39% of the Business Court’s opinions to date reach the merits; the balance is threshold and jurisdictional work, and removal-timing and amount-in-controversy disputes remain active. H.B. 40 directed the Supreme Court of Texas to adopt rules for early and final resolution of jurisdictional questions, which should help. And unlike arbitration, the Business Court does not eliminate jury exposure.

The Business Court Alternative Is Not Automatic: Consent and Geography

Everything above assumes the Business Court is actually available to the dispute. Two threshold conditions govern that, and both are controlled at the drafting table rather than at the courthouse.

Both sides have to be in — in the contract, or afterward.

Clearing the $5 million threshold does not by itself put a commercial dispute in the Business Court. Section 25A.004(d)(3) of the Government Code supplies jurisdiction over an action arising out of a contract or commercial transaction in which the parties agreed to the Business Court’s jurisdiction, insurance contracts excepted. The qualified-transaction route under § 25A.004(d)(1) does not require consent, but it does require the transaction to qualify — and the court’s early docket is full of fights over exactly that. An express consent-to-jurisdiction provision, signed by both sides, takes that argument off the table.

Consent matters twice more. First, supplemental jurisdiction over related claims under § 25A.004(f) is available only on the agreement of all parties to the claim and the consent of the division judge. If one party objects, the related claims proceed in district court while the core claims sit in the Business Court — two dockets, two judges, one dispute. A forum provision that consents to Business Court jurisdiction should therefore also consent to supplemental jurisdiction over all claims forming part of the same case or controversy.

Second, consent controls timing on removal. Under § 25A.006(f), an agreed notice of removal may be filed at any time during the pendency of the action, while a contested removal must be filed within 30 days after service or after the removing party discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the facts establishing jurisdiction. So parties who did not address the Business Court in the contract can still agree into it after suit is filed — that door stays open by consent. Parties who cannot get agreement are on a 30-day clock, and the court has enforced it.

Venue must lie in a county within an operating division.

The Business Court is a single statewide court with eleven divisions, but only five are funded and operating: the First (Dallas), Third (Austin), Fourth (San Antonio), Eighth (Fort Worth), and Eleventh (Houston). H.B. 40 removed the September 1, 2026 abolition date for the remaining six — the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth — and expanded the Eleventh Division’s geographic reach, but the six dormant divisions do not open until the Legislature appropriates money for them, which it has not yet done. Large parts of West, East, and South Texas, including El Paso, Lubbock, Amarillo, Tyler, Beaumont, and the Valley, currently have no Business Court.

Section 25A.006(e) is unforgiving about this. A party to an action filed in a county of proper venue that is not within an operating division may not remove or transfer the action to the Business Court, and neither may the judge of the court in which it was filed. There is no workaround by consent.

Venue in the Business Court can be established by a written contract that specifies a county as venue. § 25A.006(a)(3). The drafting instruction is therefore concrete: if the Business Court is any part of the plan — as the litigation forum, or as the support court for a TAA arbitration — name a county inside an operating division. A clause that consents to Business Court jurisdiction while fixing venue in a county in a dormant division consents to nothing.

A forum provision built for this environment does three things: it consents to the Business Court’s jurisdiction and to its supplemental jurisdiction over related claims; it fixes venue in a county within an operating division; and it designates a fallback forum for the case in which Business Court jurisdiction cannot be established and the action is remanded or transferred.

Neither the FAA nor the TAA Contain Statutory Confidentiality Provisions

Because neither statutory framework provides for confidentiality, parties often rely on confidentiality provisions under specific arbitral bodies such as the AAA, JAMS, ICC, or LCIA. Contracting parties routinely add contractual confidentiality provisions but then face the risk of how a court or arbitral tribunal will address the exchange of highly confidential information during the dispute.

Key Considerations for Arbitration Clauses

Assuming the parties’ transaction meets the jurisdictional requirements of the Texas Business Courts, the parties need to decide on whether to agree to an arbitration clause. Then they must consider the specific FAA-versus-TAA election. This is a forum-design decision with key consequences that now run in several directions at once.

A few questions are worth asking before agreeing to a specific arbitration clause:

Is the counterparty a foreign entity with all or most of its assets in select overseas countries? If so, arbitration retains a decisive advantage that the Business Court does not touch, and the analysis largely ends there.

Would an erroneous award be survivable? If not, either draft for TAA-expanded review or reconsider arbitration entirely. An FAA clause without that provision is an unreviewable gamble.

Might the agreement reach an individual? If so, the § 171.002 carve-outs are a live risk, and the cost of the TAA election needs to be priced.

Is there a concern over confidential or trade secret information? If yes, include specific language addressing confidentiality and trade secret information in the parties’ contract regardless of whether the parties agree to arbitration or the courts.

Have both parties actually consented to the Business Court? The Business Court is available for a contract dispute on the parties’ agreement under § 25A.004(d)(3), and its supplemental jurisdiction over related claims requires the agreement of every party plus the division judge. Say so expressly in the contract, or be prepared to obtain an agreed removal after suit is filed — an option that remains available at any time, unlike the 30-day window for a contested removal.

Is venue fixed in a county within an operating division? Only the First (Dallas), Third (Austin), Fourth (San Antonio), Eighth (Fort Worth), and Eleventh (Houston) Divisions are funded. A venue clause pointing anywhere else forecloses the Business Court entirely — for the merits and for H.B. 40’s arbitration-support functions — and § 25A.006(e) bars removal or transfer from a non-operating county. Pair the venue selection with a fallback forum.

For a purely domestic Texas commercial dispute above $5 million between sophisticated entities, the honest answer as of September 2026 is that the gap has narrowed enough that a reflexive arbitration clause deserves a fresh look. Below $5 million, or outside an operating division, or without the parties’ consent where consent is what supplies jurisdiction, the Business Court is unavailable and the traditional calculus is intact.

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